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 Abstract
This chapter challenges contemporary policy conceptions on the historical relation-
ship between drugs and development policies. It uses a historical analysis to examine 
the interaction of drugs, governance, security, welfare and economic development 
policies within drug producing contexts in Asia, from colonialism through the period 
of decolonisation. It highlights that although modern narratives of drugs and devel-
opment tend to view the latter as new and involving even immediately contemporary 
innovations for dealing with the outcomes of drug economies and drug policies, the 
historical reality is much more complex. Managing drugs and development was a fun-
damental historical process of state regulation, control and the settling of geographi-
cal boundaries, both economically and physically. This chapter posits two foundation-
al ideas. First, the issues of drugs and development have always been fundamentally 
linked, from the globalisation of trade through mercantilist imperial policies, state 
formation, the limits of governance, the distribution of economic gains, and political 
economy outcomes stretching from the local to the global. Drugs, licit and illicit, have 
therefore always been an issue of economic development. Second, policymakers have 
long recognised and developed state responses based on the above reality. While not 
going under its now ‘official’ title, many of the principles of ‘alternative development’ 
have been ingrained in policy responses and limitations over the past several centuries.
1 Introduction
Modern narratives of drugs and development tend to view the latter as new 
and even immediately contemporary innovations for dealing with the out-
comes of drug economies and drug policies (UN General Assembly, 2013). 
Alternative development is seen as a logical evolution of the United Nations 
(UN) drug control system, rather than a phenomenon whose doctrines long 
predated the modern control system. Moreover, attempts to link contemporary 
 
 
 
 
John Collins - 9789004440494
Downloaded from Brill.com09/09/2020 02:03:34PM
via London School of Economics
44 Collins
illicit economies and their management to the Sustainable Development Goals 
(sdg s) again view this as a novel framework, the tenets of which policymakers 
have historically shunned. In both cases, the historical reality, as this chapter 
will demonstrate, was far more complex. Opium and the licit– illicit economy 
divide was always a fundamental issue of political economy and economic de-
velopment. Moreover it was treated as such by local elites and European colo-
nial elites. Its typification into a simple dichotomy between eradication and 
development, as often encapsulated within one- dimensional views of ‘alterna-
tive development’, misses this larger historical story. Drugs and development 
was a fundamental historical process of state regulation, control and the set-
tling of geographical boundaries, both economically and physically. This chap-
ter attempts to tell this story through the long history of drugs as development 
and the history of drug policy as development within the Asian region up to 
the period of decolonisation.
This paper posits two foundational ideas for better understanding contem-
porary drugs and development policies. First, the issues of drugs and develop-
ment have always been fundamentally linked, from the globalisation of trade, 
through mercantilist imperial policies, state formation, the limits of govern-
ance, the distribution of economic gains, and political economy outcomes 
stretching from the local to the global. Drugs, licit and illicit have therefore 
always been an issue of economic development. Second, policymakers have 
long recognised and developed state responses based on the above reali-
ty. While not under the official title of ‘alternative development’, many of its 
principles have been ingrained in policy responses and limitations over the 
past several centuries. British administrators sought to navigate the political 
economy of the Indian opium trade. Administrators in Burma promoted a 
development- first, harm reductionist approach (although not specifically la-
belled as such) that placed economic and political stability ahead of ideolog-
ical and drug fetishist goals of eradication and prohibitions, even if this ran 
counter to emerging international norms and obligations. Beneath often lofty, 
ideological and normative aspirational goals, policymakers frequently and ex-
plicitly recognised the issue of drugs and drug markets as one of economic 
development and economic fundamentals.
This of course raises the complicated and contested question of how one 
defines ‘development’, particularly over a long historical case study. For exam-
ple, it might be pointed out that, Asian countries, during the colonial period, 
had little agency or right over national governance issues that were determined 
to a large extent in the capitals of Europe. This raises the question of ‘whose 
development?’ Nevertheless, to proceed with this discussion we must build a 
model of development based on a selection of criteria (Bassi et al., 2019). As  
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this is a discussion of the role of development within drug control, we must 
use the two most commonly referenced frameworks— that of alternative de-
velopment and how the United Nations General Assembly Special Session on 
the World Drug Problem in 2016 addressed this (UN General Assembly, 2016), 
and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development agreed in 2015 (UN General 
Assembly, 2015). This chapter thereby engages questions of development and 
drug control policies from UN frameworks that serve as the basis for under-
standing contemporary donor and member state approaches. Furthermore, 
it draws on drug crop cultivation literature that utilises development para-
digms to understand the ‘double- edged sword’ of illicit drug economies (Bux-
ton, 2015; Mansfield and Pain, 2005). That is, that they represent an alienating 
force with regard to many mainstream development processes, in many ways 
separating the communities from the political and economic core, while also 
providing cash crops to enable self- sufficiency, capital accumulation, resourc-
es for paid access to private health and economic and security services. The 
question, therefore, is not simply one of drug crops providing short- term eco-
nomic gains or ‘growth’. It is instead about understanding the impacts of these 
changing drug economies and the regulations governing them, on the funda-
mental social, economic, political, environmental and security circumstances 
of communities and nation states experiencing them. These are, under the 
umbrella of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, key issues relat-
ed to economic development and can be conceptualised as such in historical 
analyses. This is the jumping off point for this chapter.
2 Drugs as a Historical Phenomenon
As historian William O. Walker iii wrote, ‘[t] here is no adequate way […] to 
understand the foreign and security policy issues affecting Asia without appre-
ciation of opium’s role’ (Walker, 1992). This chapter expands this statement to 
include the role of development: there is no way to understand the economic 
development and development policies of large parts of Asia without a thor-
ough understanding of the role of drugs.
First, the globalisation of the opium trade in Asia closely resembled the 
globalisation of transnational labour and population flows. Beginning in the 
nineteenth century, China provided the first large- scale ‘free wage labour’ 
for parts of Southeast Asia. Migrant workers moved en masse into these 
regions— namely Malaya, Sumatra, southern Siam, Tonkin and Borneo— and 
were quickly recruited into tin or gold mines, or plantations of pepper, gambi-
er, sugar, tobacco and rubber (Trocki, 2002, 300). Although Chinese migration 
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had less of an impact on more populous regions, such as Siam, Java, Cochin- 
China and Southern Burma (Trocki, 2002), the migration of Haw, Hmong and 
other tribes from China into other parts of Asia favoured the spread of opi-
um cultivation and consumption (Chouvy, 2013). The two often moved hand 
in hand. For example, an official League of Nations Commission of Enquiry 
reported in 1930 that ‘[c] ontact with Chinese Immigrants has in other Far- 
Eastern territories usually been the cause of the indigenous population ac-
quiring the opium- smoking habit’ (League of Nations, 1930, 37). Indeed, the 
recognition of this interaction between commodity trades and labour move-
ments helps explain the historical plurality of regulatory frameworks en-
forced within many Southeast Asian territories, with different rules applying 
to different migrant or indigenous communities within the same geographic 
territories (Collins, 2017a).
Second, the expansion of drug markets was an inevitably economic, and 
thereby developmental, phenomenon. The expansion of drug supply and drug 
markets globally was an innate process of globalisation. As Chouvy writes, 
‘[t] he caravan tracks of the Haw, which crisscrossed Siam very early, largely 
contributed in turning Thailand into a privileged hub of heroin trafficking’ 
(Chouvy, 2013, 4). Meanwhile, the contemporary trade routes serving legal and 
illegal commodities were effectively the same as those the Burmese had used 
previously to invade Siam, including in the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries 
(Chouvy, 2013). The link between illicit economies, empire, state formation 
and conflict is at once inextricable and innately complex.
Third, the production and consumption of mind- altering substances has 
been an inextricable part of social history. Globalisation merely accelerated 
and magnified this phenomenon, making it global. As David Courtwright 
highlights, like other global commodities drugs were influenced by techno-
logical changes that significantly increased the gross tonnage of supplies 
and trade. Efforts to control drugs were an inevitable by- product of their in-
creasing prevalence, ubiquity, visibility and economic impacts (Courtwright, 
2012). Global control initiatives therefore focused on regulating and restrict-
ing supply to socially determined notions of ‘legitimate’ use. As McAllister 
and Spillane write, ‘The central question’ at the turn of the twentieth century 
‘was not whether the state would ultimately restrict some aspects of distri-
bution and sale, but whose authority would be privileged in the process of 
creating and implementing those regulations’ (Spillane and McAllister, 2003, 
S.6). State interactions with drug markets, and attempts to define the limits 
of acceptability, desirability and the benefits/ costs that accrued to governing 
political entities, represented a modern extension of earlier social norms and 
practices. The latter had served as checks on production and consumption in 
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premodern societies while modern empires and states sought to control these 
commodities through regulations and prohibitions in pursuit of political– 
economic ends.
3 European Empires, Mercantilism and Control of the Sino- Indian 
Opium Trade
Historian Peter Dale Scott similarly argues that in order to understand post- 
World War ii illicit drug trades in Asia, one must first understand the opium 
policies of the British Empire in the nineteenth century (Scott, 2010). The Sino- 
Indian opium trade began in the mid- sixteenth century, and was soon taken 
over by Portuguese, British and Dutch traders. A fragmentary and ultimately 
localised trade soon became subsumed under the monopoly of the British East 
India Trading Company (eic). With it, India became the dominant regional, 
and thereby global actor in the trade (Windle, 2012). Thus, European empires 
transformed the issue into a global one, with concomitant cross border geopo-
litical and legal issues. Where one imperial state, China, increasingly sought 
to restrict and prohibit the domestic consumption of opium (Westad, 2012), 
European empires looked to it as a corrective to major trading imbalances and 
thereby a mercantilist route towards trading and political power within the 
region (Trocki, 1999).
China’s early opium concerns became acute as it manifested as a foreign 
influence. The prohibitionist policies of 1729 directly reflected its perception 
as a practice centred on the south- east coast. Opium, under this conception, 
was not a problem related to cultivation or consumption but to smuggling 
and foreign interference (Bello, 2003). As opium became associated with 
Western consumption practices, namely the mixing with tobacco to form 
smokable opium known as ‘madak’, so too did the sense of foreign incur-
sion and threat (Courtwright, 2012). These early concerns became amplified 
when it became apparent that the Chinese state was haemorrhaging silver 
to buy Indian opium. Qing efforts to counter these outflows ultimately pro-
duced the Opium Wars with Great Britain (Bello, 2003). China’s defeat in 
these conflicts, and its forced opening to trade with the West, saw China le-
galise opium. This was formalised under the Convention of Peking of 1860, in 
part to provide revenues to sustain the ever- weakening Chinese government 
(Brown, 2002).
Meanwhile, at a more local level, the development of Yunnan as a major 
source of opium reiterated both the formidable economic role of the commod-
ity as well as the limits of the Qing State’s reach. As Bello writes,
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
John Collins - 9789004440494
Downloaded from Brill.com09/09/2020 02:03:34PM
via London School of Economics
48 Collins
Qing prohibition in the southwest alerted authorities to the existence of 
an alternative domestic source of opium that thrived on weaknesses in 
the imperial administrative system. Ethno- geographic conditions in Yun-
nan weakened the central government’s local administrative presence, 
which was already prone to a dependence on unconventional revenue 
sources. The southwestern traffic was well placed to exploit these weak-
nesses. Moreover, local cultivation of opium proved particularly suited 
to the needs of the indigenous peoples, Han peasants, and merchants, as 
well as local dynastic officials, because it was powerful enough to gener-
ate incomes for all concerned.
bello, 2003, 1134
Meanwhile, the Qing State itself became reliant on opium revenue, a reality 
that helped negate central government efforts to enforce prohibition in many 
interior regions (Bello, 2003, 1135). Indeed, Bello continues, ‘it was competition 
from southwestern afurong, not pressure from central government prohibi-
tion, [that] ultimately drove Indian opium from China’ (Bello, 2003, 1134).
The development of opium markets in Asia thereby had undoubtedly 
large macroeconomic and thus political impacts. These often simply rein-
forced economic development processes already underway. European pow-
ers used revenue farming systems to minimise their imperial administrative 
and political cost base. In this way, they ‘farmed out’ revenue collection to 
indigenous elites by auctioning the right to tax or develop a monopoly on 
distribution or sale of a specific good, including opium, alcohol, sex work, 
gambling and other activities. Opium represented a particularly liquid enter-
prise with high cash flow and thereby an ability to accumulate large capital 
stocks. Trocki goes further, arguing that the opium farming systems exist-
ing in parts of India, China and virtually all Southeast Asian states ‘were im-
portant adjuncts of capitalist development within the region’ (Trocki, 2002, 
297). Therein developed a premodern economic fabric to weave together 
the complex strands of governance, taxation, local elite development and 
control of the most fundamental principle of sovereignty— the ability to tax. 
Again, as Trocki writes,
The farms also financed commodity production and helped to generate 
the infrastructure for consumer economies. These institutions helped to 
create the finance and state structures that protected businessmen and 
their profits […] In fact, all Asian governments depended upon opium 
farms for major portions of their revenue.
trocki, 2002, pp. 297– 8
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There seems little to question, therefore, regarding the common belief that 
opium held ‘immense importance’ for the Indian and global economy in the 
nineteenth century (Richards, 2002a, 151). For all its merits, however, Trocki’s 
work derives from a heavily critical framework, perhaps too deterministic in 
its utilisation of macroeconomic indicators to demonstrate an imperial inflec-
tion point in Asian economic development. This may help overshadow the 
situational role of opium within local political economies. Taking the latter 
approach may instead place imperialism as one strand in a broader web of 
development. Furthermore, Trocki’s work perhaps serves to fetishise opium as 
a sole determinant of imperial expansion. Extending Trocki’s macroeconomic 
insights, a microeconomic level analysis provides some additional potentially 
useful insights.
Kranton and Swamy examine the market structures surrounding the eic 
opium monopoly and compare it to its textiles trade (Kranton and Swamy, 
2008). The eic initially operated an opium contract system, but accusations 
of corruption, abuse of locals and low quality products led to the adoption 
of an ‘Agency System’ in 1797 (Kranton and Swamy, 2008, 982). Private culti-
vation and sale was banned; agents provided capital advances to producers 
on behalf of the Company; farmers had to grow in specific areas, harvest and 
deliver opium to agents. It was then generally marked for auction in Calcutta 
to privateers, who would largely sell on to China (Kranton and Swamy, 2008). 
Profits were high, and monopoly power was openly wielded to thwart compe-
tition, and occasionally utilised to flood the market, such as during the 1830s. 
Meanwhile, standards and quality maintained the Opium Agency and ensured 
it survived for over a century. By 1860, around the time the Crown ended the 
eic and assumed direct administration of India, opium represented 17 per 
cent of the Government of India’s revenues (Kranton and Swamy, 2008). Sim-
ilar stories pervaded the region. In the last decades of the nineteenth century, 
the Netherlands’ Indies opium farms accounted for 18 per cent of total colonial 
revenue, or 35 per cent of tax revenue, and French Cochin- China and Siam 
showed comparable figures (Trocki, 2002). In Siam in 1905‒6, opium farms 
yielded one- fifth of total government revenue, almost double the second most 
important revenue source, gambling farms. Yet in 1907 the Siamese govern-
ment abolished the opium farm system and took over sole administration of 
the opium monopoly (Brown, 1993).
As a counterexample, the eic operated a typical procurement process for 
textiles— providing a capital or input advance with a promise to deliver by the 
supplier, whereupon compensation would be provided. This proved difficult to 
enforce given opportunities for both sides to partially go back on these com-
mitments, and uncertain enforcement mechanisms. Competition amongst 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
John Collins - 9789004440494
Downloaded from Brill.com09/09/2020 02:03:34PM
via London School of Economics
50 Collins
buyers gave weavers many potential outlets, linkages between the eic and 
its local agents were weak and undermined by information asymmetries, and 
centralised eic control in London limited the ability of local actors to adjust 
to market clearing prices (Kranton and Swamy, 2008). The eic Opium Agen-
cy avoided many of these problems. It was a legal monopsony and monopoly, 
and thereby negated legal competition for suppliers’ produce. Local agents 
had greater flexibility on pricing, while the eic simultaneously pursued great-
er oversight of agents and reinvested supernormal profits into anti- corruption 
measures (Kranton and Swamy, 2008). Nevertheless, over time, the indigenous 
poppy growers of Yunnan and Sichuan provinces in China supplanted the role 
of traffickers and opium from British India. This meant that by the close of the 
nineteenth century, Qing China, specifically its south- west provinces where 
enforcement capabilities were more limited, was the world’s largest producer 
of opium (Bello, 2003).
Burma, meanwhile, proved a complicated case. Ethnic divisions produced 
differing policies. Nineteenth century rulers in Burma had sought to prohibit 
opium use by ethnic Burmans, but largely excluded Chinese, Shan and Kachin 
inhabitants from restrictions on consumption. Initially, British conquest 
brought a standardisation of policies with India, including prohibitions on lo-
cal production and mandating purchases of Indian monopoly opium. Howev-
er, following the conquest of Upper Burma in 1885, a more strict policy was in-
stituted, effectively mimicking the regulations imposed by previous Burmese 
rulers, forbidding the sale of alcohol or opium to Burmans, while establishing 
shops to sell to Chinese and non- Burmans (Richards, 2002b). Eventually, re-
formist pressure at home forced an application of these more stringent rules to 
Lower Burma also (Richards, 2002b). Thereby, within Burma, the Government 
of India had shifted from a pragmatic policy of what Richards terms ‘maxi-
mum revenue from minimum consumption’ and now ‘committed itself to a 
new level of social control— one that would be exceedingly difficult to enforce’ 
(Richards, 2002b, 413 and 418). A surge in the illicit market drove the govern-
ment to quickly backtrack. It relaxed restrictions on licensed shops in Lower 
Burma and these gradually expanded, supplied by Indian opium as well as sei-
zures of Chinese and Shan State Illicit Opium.
3.1 Rethinking the Socioeconomic Impacts of the Sino- Indian 
Opium Trade
Conventional analysis has portrayed the Sino- Indian opium trade in stark 
terms. It was an aggressively extractive imperial enterprise that impoverished 
and degraded all but investors in the metropole. As Alfred McCoy wrote, Brit-
ish India ‘became Asia’s first large- scale opium smuggler, forcibly supplying 
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an unwilling China’ (McCoy, 2003, 78). This conception represented conven-
tional wisdom for much of the last century, with many improbably attribut-
ing impoverishment to the suppliers as well. A 2019 bbc article, for example, 
sought to remind audiences ‘How Britain’s opium trade impoverished Indians’ 
(Biswas, 2019).
More recent historical analysis, however, does not seem to support the view-
point that ‘opium causes poverty’. Some scholars attribute the development of 
capitalism in Southeast Asia to the revenue farming system, of which opium 
was a key pillar. As Trocki writes,
Before the nineteenth century, it is no exaggeration to say that capitalism 
did not really exist in Southeast Asia […] Even those who did produce 
for the global market rarely sold their goods into the market and they 
consumed even less from it. Many exchanges were ritualised and took 
place within relations of dependence. Despite centuries of commerce, 
there was no real middle class in any Southeast Asian society, nor was 
there any ‘free’ wage labour. There was no properly commercial forms 
of production, finance or banking and there were no systems of law that 
would have protected or regulated such enterprises. Rulers were arbitrary 
and absolute; wealth in itself could not effectively exist without the pro-
tection of the power elites.
trocki, 2002, 299
It was the European empires that brought capitalism and stitched the South-
east Asian economies into the global economic system. Opium, at least in part, 
enabled this. However, it was not solely a European creation. Instead, it was the 
Chinese who largely created the local capitalist institutions capable of inter-
facing with the global economy. Under these conditions, opium farming served 
as a key impetus and mechanism, serving also as likely the largest financial 
generator for emerging Chinese businesses. Opium farming conferred primacy 
of wealth and political power, making contract holders ‘inevitably the richest 
and most powerful individuals in their communities’, extracting massive rents 
while engaging in minimal day- to- day activities (Trocki, 2002, 299). This is not 
to say that these contract holders had a largely passive role. They were key 
intermediaries, coalescing financial resources and investors, and subsequently 
managing the resultant investments. The farms, thereby, served as major focal 
points for capital accumulation, and with it economic and political power. This 
reality leads Trocki to label the opium farms as ‘the first and perhaps most ef-
fective means of accumulation in nineteenth- century Southeast Asia’ (Trocki, 
2002, pp. 299– 300). Once the opium passed through the monthly auctions, it 
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ceased to be a concern of the eic and would change hands multiple times 
before ending up with one of the large Chinese exporting firms, which would 
ship it to Shanghai via Hong Kong or south China ports and their mainland 
wholesalers (Newman, 1989).
Richards, meanwhile, argues that the trade ‘benefitted the Indian econ-
omy and some groups in society more broadly than is generally recognised’ 
(Richards, 2002a, 152). Both its export value and quantity increased over the 
nineteenth century. Coupled with a high value- to- weight ratio, this meant that 
its large profit margins had strong direct and indirect impacts on the econo-
my (Richards, 2002b). The 1878 Opium Act superseded provincial regulations 
and their inconsistent application, and gave the Government of India the sole 
right to regulate and control production through distribution and possession 
(Richards, 2002b). By the 1880s it was still likely one of the highest value com-
modities in global trade routes, with roughly 5,400 metric tons departing from 
Calcutta and Bombay each year, producing 93.5 million rupees in government 
revenue (Richards, 2002b, 377). Simultaneously, the Opium Act served to fur-
ther cement a process already underway, namely shrinking the geographic ar-
eas under cultivation (Richards, 2002b).
Nevertheless, reformist pressure grew in Britain for the outright abolition of 
the trade. A Royal Commission on Opium was appointed to examine the ques-
tion. Its findings, however, ran directly counter to the claims of abolitionists. 
The Commission minimised the impact that the trade was having on social 
and political decay, while pointing to the substantial financial and economic 
impacts an end to the trade would impose on India. Furthermore, China sim-
ply stood ready to step into the Indian void. China was under no actual obli-
gation by that point to accept Indian opium as the British Government had 
publicly relinquished a right of intervention (Richards, 2002b). Reformists 
lambasted the report as pushing an economic status quo and ‘whitewashing’ 
of the reality on the ground (Berridge, 1999; Richards, 2002b). This negative 
view of the Commission has permeated much historiography since, although 
more recent revisionist historiography has pushed back. As Richards writes in 
2005, to  assume
[t] hat the Government of India somehow deceived the members of the 
Commission by a Potemkin village façade is also erroneous […]The Roy-
al Commission on opium was not a whitewash […] Opinion in the Indi-
an- owned English language and Indian language press strongly opposed 
prohibition […] [meanwhile] a majority of the leaders of the fledgling 
Indian National Congress, while uneasy with the moral aspects of the 
opium trade […] disapproved of the anti- opium agitation occurring 
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in England and […] saw the reform campaign as a form of cultural 
 imperialism.
richards, 2002b, pp. 380– 1
Richards goes further:
In their zeal to attack the iniquities of the opium traffic and the British 
imperial interests that supported and profited from it, the reformers sen-
sationalised the presumed harm done to Indian consumers of opium and 
minimized the costs to India of ending the traffic. They ignored Indian 
sensitivities by denying any cultural and social value to the use of opium. 
The opium reformers were blinded by strongly ethnocentric biases— 
more so than those British officials, physicians and others who actually 
lived in India.
richards, 2002b, 381
In many ways, the British rulers feared most the social unrest that could fol-
low any attempts to interfere with local cultural sensibilities, economic activ-
ities or other political sensitivities. Since the 1857 revolt, they had assiduously 
avoided anything that could provoke local backlash, such as interfering with 
the opium system. As Richards writes,
[f] or opium, as for alcohol and cannabis (ganja), the Government of In-
dia avoided absolutist positions. It assumed that consumption of these 
substances would continue, that abstinence was a chimera and that the 
best the state could do would be to restrain these habits. The system that 
emerged in each major region of the subcontinent was sensitive to vary-
ing local conditions, cultural preferences and economic circumstances.
richards, 2002b, 409
This would be mirrored by the approach of British administrators in Burma 
half a century later. Still, proponents of the status quo faced a losing battle. 
Professional moralists and reformers only increased pressure and internation-
al regulations, at first bilateral, then multilateral.
4 New Regimes
The beginning of the end of the mercantilist opium systems came with the 
Anglo- Chinese Opium Agreements of 1907‒14. Britain, often portrayed as a 
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reluctant protagonist in the international control system, in fact helped in-
augurate it through these far- reaching bilateral agreements. From its peak in 
the 1870s, opium had been supplanted by domestic Chinese opium by 1900. 
Still, it represented the Government of India’s third largest source of revenue 
and China’s biggest source of customs revenue as well as a major cash crop 
for millions of Indian peasant farmers. Opium also served as an important 
social and ‘quasi- medical’ outlet for large numbers of labourers throughout 
the region, a physical and mental escape from the daily toil of back- breaking 
work (Newman, 1989). While traditional historiography portrayed Britain and 
other imperial powers as pursuing naked economic self- interest in bucking 
reformist calls for international prohibitions, more recent work has drawn 
a more complex picture. Imperial powers were at once conflicted and am-
bivalent about opium’s role within the economic systems and societies they 
managed, but ultimately reluctant to attempt grand experiments with social 
engineering, such as prohibition (Collins, 2015; McAllister, 2000; Mills, 2014; 
Newman, 1989).
Nevertheless, changing economic realities helped weaken the opposition 
to prohibitions. Transportation improvements reinforced the comparative 
attractiveness of producing bulkier and perishable commodities for global 
markets. Wheat, barley, sugar, tobacco and potatoes all pushed poppy out 
of fields (Newman, 1989). In Ghazipur, opium production succumbed to rice 
and oil seed production in the 1880s, opium ending the century at roughly 
half the production it had seen in 1875. In other parts, famine and irrigation 
difficulties and labour shortages drove a decline in production (Newman, 
1989). Meanwhile, in the midst of controversy over the Royal Commission 
on Opium and accusations that local officials had ‘ruthlessly stage managed’ 
the field visits, Indian opium departments proved unwilling to allow opium 
prices to rise. Cultivators fled en masse to other crops, never to return. This 
led Robert Neuman to describe the sympathetic stance of the Royal Com-
mission as ‘a pyrrhic victory from which the Government of India never 
recovered’ (Newman, 1989, 530). These issues only served to reinforce the 
critical challenge posed by Chinese domestic cultivation (Richards, 2002a) 
alongside incipient competition from Persian and Turkish opium within the 
region (Newman, 1989).
International opinion only hardened further against opium in the interim. 
A chorus of progressive and missionary opinion in the United States (US) coa-
lesced with a vocal domestic China lobby. The latter in particular, saw opium as 
a policy bridge to strengthening Sino- US commercial relations (Collins, 2015). 
Simultaneously, the US encountered its own opium dilemma through its oc-
cupation of the Philippines. Ultimately, the US adopted a policy of outright 
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prohibition, despite the misgivings of its local administrators (Musto, 1999). 
Washington looked at the European monopolies not as a mechanism to con-
trol a complicated trade, but as an attempt to provide legitimacy to a large 
source for potential diversion into illicit supplies. The only regulation the US 
argued as sustainable was outright prohibition except for medical and scientif-
ic use. Although the European powers initially continued to push back against 
this aggressive approach, the tide was clearly working against them (Collins, 
2015; Musto, 1999).
China meanwhile took pre- emptive action. It announced with an imperi-
al edict in 1906 that ‘foreign and native opium’ would be eradicated within 
ten years (quoted in Newman, 1989, 531). Despite significant scepticism, and 
mixed implementation, the campaign proved surprisingly effective, in the 
short run at least. The domestic mood in China had turned strongly against 
opium. These Chinese domestic efforts rendered resistance from British and 
Indian elites seemingly more indefensible (Newman, 1989). The Government 
of India and their Chinese counterparts reached an agreement whereby India 
would reduce its exports of opium to China by ten per cent per year, resulting 
in a predicted cessation of the trade in 1917. This agreement, the first of the 
Anglo- Chinese Opium Agreements, was signed in December 1907 and came 
into force in January 1908 (Newman, 1989). Britain, quite justifiably, viewed 
itself as having made a major concession, at a significant cost to its imperial 
coffers. In most areas— particularly Bihar and Benares, where it constituted a 
monopoly— the agreement largely served to reinforce trends away from opium 
cultivation. These trends were driven by various push and pull factors already 
discussed. In the more complicated region of Malwa, reduction proved more 
difficult from legal, administrative and economic perspectives. As Newman 
writes,
The opium interests in Malwa faced difficulty if not ruin. Local mer-
chants needed to sell their chests with a minimum of delay to the export-
ers in Bombay if they were to recoup their investment; moreover, many of 
them were holding substantial reserves of old opium which now seemed 
unlikely to find a market at all. If local merchants and moneylenders be-
came bankrupt they would reduce the supply of credit to Malwa peasant-
ry and hamper the process of crop substitution, which was already less 
advanced in Malwa than in northern India […] the decline of the China 
trade endangered many of the princely economies […] [while] [i] n the 
matter of agricultural diversification and development there was little 
beyond exhortation that the Government of India could do.
newman, 1989, pp. 537– 8
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China meanwhile surpassed its targets, as provincial officials bought into the 
policy, ripped up local crops, closed dens and thereby sought to minimise 
foreign imports. This was simply reinforced by the economic turmoil within 
China’s regions (Newman, 1989). These factors weighed on the next round of 
Anglo- Chinese opium negotiations, which began in mid- 1910. This, instead of 
an agreement, took the form of a treaty, formalising a continued and more 
legalistic commitment to 10 per cent annual reductions. The compromise out-
come was praised in London but raised the ire of communities in India and 
China. The former lamented that their ‘opium revenues are now practically 
gone’ leaving them ‘in a nice financial mess’, while Chinese anti- opium groups 
reacted angrily to concessions made to India (quoted in Newman, 1989, 551). 
The reality, however, was the formalisation of Britain’s commitment to the 
eradication of the opium trade with China.
In the meantime, multilateralism took root. Under Article 6 of The Hague 
Opium Convention of 1912, states parties committed to the gradual ‘suppression 
of the manufacture, the internal traffic in and the use of prepared opium in so 
far as the different conditions peculiar to each nation shall allow’ (The Hague 
International Opium Convention, 1912, Paragraph 6). Going into force following 
the Versailles settlement of World War i, under the aegis of the League of Na-
tions, the international drug control system sought to implement this goal. It did 
so, however, in a broadly uneven manner. Opium smoking continued in the East 
Indies, Malaya, the Unfederated Malay States, Brunei, Sarawak, Burma, India, 
Ceylon, North Borneo, Hong Kong, Indochina and Siam (Collins, 2017a). Many 
governments argued that opium consumption in many of these contexts rep-
resents a form of medical use, which could be termed ‘quasi- medical’ use (Col-
lins, 2015). Furthermore, outright prohibitions were seen as potentially wors-
ening local conditions. This included undermining gains made in regulating 
consumption via rationing and registration, control over what would otherwise 
become an illicit market, and the positive spillovers from driving the revenue 
from opium into government coffers rather than actors that might seek to use it 
to weaken governance in the territories in which they operated (Collins, 2017a).
The international regulatory system, meanwhile, continued to develop at 
the intersection of these Sino- US and European colonial visions (Collins, 2018). 
However, its practical impact was limited by the functional collapse of the Chi-
nese state. From 1917, local military leaders encouraged cultivation to strength-
en their financial base in the face of dwindling central government control 
(Taylor, 1969). Japan also increased its role in the Chinese opium economy, 
shifting towards self- sufficiency in opium production and then becoming a 
leading supplier of illicit narcotics into China through its Southern Manchuria 
enclave (Jennings, 1997). In 1932, the Manchukuo puppet regime established 
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a government- run monopoly, going against the grain of League of Nations 
control efforts and buying from states perceived as rogue operators within the 
emerging control regime (Collins, 2017b). Many have ascribed conspiracy to 
Japan’s efforts— a forceful ‘narcotisation’ of China in pursuit of imperialist 
goals. Indeed, the same accusations were levelled against Japan in its war with 
the US (Collins, 2015). Others have pointed to economic– structural determi-
nants. Japan was, like so many protagonists in licit and illicit drug markets, 
merely following strategic and economic necessities dictated by local political 
economies. As Meyer and Parssinen write, ‘[w] hat looked like genocide and 
conspiracy at the highest levels’ actually represented ‘political compromise in 
pursuit of larger goals’ (Meyer and Parssinen, 2002, 280). In reality, both Japa-
nese and Chinese forces utilised the opium trade for local and national strate-
gic ends (Collins, 2017b).
The 1930s in India saw an appropriation of prohibition policies. The peri-
od 1920‒40 witnessed a rapid decline in domestic consumption. The Indian 
National Congress Party pursued policies of local prohibition from 1937, and 
looked towards prohibition throughout the nation (Brown, 2002). World War 
ii placed a temporary hold on these efforts, but US pressure on Britain had 
produced a broad, although not uniform, commitment to end the practice of 
opium smoking in territories upon reoccupation (Collins, 2017a). Furthermore, 
after independence in 1947 the National Congress reinstituted its policy aim of 
prohibiting all production and consumption except for medical and scientific 
use. The government established a Narcotics Commission to assume control of 
all aspects of production and pricing. Over the following six years, consump-
tion reportedly fell by 45 per cent, largely due to restricted production and in-
creased price. In 1959, sale was completely prohibited, and oral consumption 
was prohibited except for registered consumers. The shift in policy has been 
described by one scholar as ‘one of the world’s most successful campaigns to 
limit the drug’s cultivation and use’ (Brown, 2002, 627).
Others offer a more critical appraisal. As Richards writes,
Opium offered a cash crop to perhaps two million of the most skilful cul-
tivators in both northern British and western Princely India. When opi-
um exports dwindled and eventually ended in 1935, the Indian economy 
lost an economic asset, just as it did when indigo, for example, ceased to 
be a viable cash crop.
richards, 2002b, 180
Burma, meanwhile, emerged as a key actor in its own right in international 
drug policy when it separated from India in 1937. It was now expected to adhere 
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to the various international treaties, but with no clear sense that it held the ca-
pacity to do so. The 1923 Opium Order established an effective legal monopoly 
over supply, making Cis- Salween Sawbwas opium monopsonists and further 
limiting sale to consumers (Maule, 1992). However, implementation varied. For 
example, the Northern Shan States operated via monopoly auctions, policed 
by the monopoly owner. In the Trans- Salween Shan States, weak political con-
trol negated such an approach. Proximity to China and the unchecked produc-
tion underway there was viewed as a key limiting factor. This only strength-
ened British resolve that any risk of social unrest was too high a price to pay 
for the uncertain promise of additional opium prohibitions (Maule, 1992). Se-
curity, governance and development came first, for officials in Burma at least 
( Collins, 2016).
In 1931 Burma officials had proposed a closed system of control, with li-
cenced shops being supplied by Shan State opium and potentially exporting 
excesses to Siam, French Indochina and the Dutch East Indies. London and 
the Government of India quickly vetoed the idea, citing, among other issues, 
international obligations under the emerging League of Nations treaty sys-
tem. A  compromise arrangement saw a commitment from the Government 
of India to continue supplying Burma with cheap opium, coupled with a light 
touch approach to the fluid production and informal trading arrangements on 
the borders with Siam and China. With formal separation from India in 1937, 
the idea of utilising Shan opium became appealing once again (Maule, 1992). 
Burma received a significant mark- up reselling cost price Indian opium, pro-
ducing roughly 500 per cent profit. Although opium had collapsed to around 1 
per cent of India’s government revenue by the 1930s, for Burma the loss of this 
supply provoked a more acute fiscal unease. Recognising this reality, London 
sought to redirect the international spotlight away from the situation in Bur-
ma, for example exempting the Shan States from new obligations agreed at 
the 1931 Bangkok opium conference (Maule, 1992). Beneath this protective ap-
proach was a concern that any increased reliance on Shan opium would come 
at the cost of increased leakages into the illicit market and would thereby draw 
new international attention. The issue was not so much political will as regu-
latory capacity, something the Burmese government lacked in these outer re-
gions (Collins, 2017b).
British policies produced a de facto division of the country based on 
governance capabilities and a pluralistic approach to policy enforcement 
(Collins, 2017b). Burma gained independence in January 1948 and focused im-
mediately on internal security and economic recovery and development. It 
adopted a strict policy of neutrality in the emerging Cold War; however, the 
US came to view it as a key potential domino for a communist takeover of the 
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region as well as a potential ‘back door’ into China (Selth, 2010). The Com-
munist takeover of China in 1949 saw the greatest historical influx of refugees 
into the mountains of Shan and Kachin States. These refugees settled with-
out the permission of the Burmese government and included remnants of 
the Kuomintang (kmt) army and local Yunnan militias. These groups quickly 
coalesced into guerilla forces in the 1950s, their bases providing security and 
governance infrastructure, which drew in civilian refugees seeking protection 
from the Burmese army and local ethnic militias (Chang, 2009). The pro-
longed economic crisis in Burma resulted in a shortage of consumers’ goods, 
which in turn stimulated the cross border illicit trade, which in turn funded 
the militias through taxation. Some estimates placed the trade at 80 per cent 
of Burma’s total consumption, most of which came via Thailand and through 
the Shan State (Chang, 2009, 550).
5 Decolonisation and the Emergence of the Golden Triangle
The Golden Triangle would ultimately emerge at the intersection of these forces 
and geographic areas. It centres on the bordering regions of Burma, Laos and 
Thailand. It is a remote, densely forested area populated by a diverse array of 
ethnic groups, many of whom traditionally followed semi- nomadic slash- and- 
burn agriculture practices (Chouvy, 2013). As Chouvy writes,
[T] he international borders of Burma, Laos, and Thailand also cut across 
two zones that are intricately woven together:  the Tai linguistic zone, 
composed of Shan, Thai, and Lao peoples, over which is superimposed a 
more complex zone of numerous other ethnic groups that are dispersed 
throughout the tri- border area and in neighbouring China.
chouvy, 2013, 1
The region flourished as a postcolonial centre of the illicit trade for the same 
reasons it had proven so difficult to incorporate under colonial economic and 
political systems of control. It is based within untamed terrain of mountains, 
rivers and forest, with minimal infrastructure and a reality of annual monsoons 
that negate whatever infrastructure does exist for several months of the year. 
In such circumstances, the reliance on cash crops becomes not only explicable 
but often essential to community survival. Much like the earlier evolutions of 
the opium trade within the region, however, these geographic and ethnic de-
terminants were not sufficient explainers for the emergence of the Golden Tri-
angle. The political economy of the post- war region was also a key determining 
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factor. Evaluating the economic and developmental overlaps between the co-
lonial and postcolonial periods, however, is the focus of another paper.
6 Conclusion
This paper demonstrates that the linkage between drugs and development is 
a longer historical phenomenon. While contemporary discourses rightly seek 
to carve greater space for development criteria within drug policy debates, this 
need is driven by a more recent systemic approach to drugs that has viewed 
its policy goals and outcomes in terms of repression, market reduction and an 
ever- greater reliance on prohibition (Collins, 2016). Development practitioners 
highlight that the most recent international drug control treaty, the 1988 UN 
Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, 
references the role of development, but in subservience to eradication efforts. 
Development could serve as a mechanism to achieve drug control goals, but 
has not been seen as an end in itself (Brombacher and Westerbarkei, 2019). This 
chapter has sought to highlight the historical counter- narratives to this prohibi-
tionist mindset that captured UN discourses following the Second World War.
Drug economies have been inextricably tied to processes of globalisation, 
economic development and governance over the past several centuries at 
least. Drug economies were often central to economic development, rather 
than something parallel or running counter to mainstream state consolidation 
efforts. Policymakers frequently viewed the issue through economic and polit-
ical lenses and formulated complex policy responses based on a mix of regula-
tory and prohibitionist elements. The drive towards prohibition as a sole global 
policy goal began to slowly coalesce around the turn of the twentieth century, 
but was far from an inevitability or a natural policy goal. Administrators and 
local populations throughout Asia had a more complex interplay with these 
local, regional and international drug economies than is often recognised. Al-
though the Royal Commission was accused of an amoral ‘whitewashing’ of the 
Sino- Indian opium trade in the region, the reality is just as likely that moral-
isers and subsequent internationalists and prohibitionists were equally, if not 
more, guilty of whitewashing the complexity of the socio- economic- political 
linkages between drug economies and societies in Asia. The recentring of 
the Sino- Indian opium trade into the Golden Triangle attests to the reality of 
drugs and drug economies as complex economic and development phenom-
ena, eschewing dichotomous labels of ‘licit’ and ‘illicit’, or dichotomous policy 
frameworks of ‘regulation’ and ‘prohibition’. Recognising these realities and 
re- examining the historical complexity of regulations within Asia is therefore 
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likely a good starting point for a better understanding of the linkages between 
drug economies and economic development.
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